Anyone who lived through the Seventies and probably more who cam after have been haunted by the story of the Wreck of the Edmund Fitzgerald, immortalized in the song by Gordon Lightfoot.
What caused the SS Edmund Fitzgerald freighter to sink amid a violent storm on Lake Superior on Nov. 10, 1975, killing its 29 crew members, remains a point of debate and mystery a half-century later.
Theories range from the Edmund Fitzgerald striking a shoal and suffering bottom damage to flooding through the freighter's hatch covers, which filled the ship with water and sank it, to rogue waves, to structural flaws in the ship that the 1975 storm made deadly.
Fed investigations: Ship likely sank due to faulty, failing hatch covers
Two major federal investigations were conducted after the Fitzgerald's 1975 sinking: the U.S. Coast Guard's Marine Board of Investigation, which released its report in July 1977; and the National Transportation Safety Board, whose findings and recommendations were released in May 1978.
The Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation, in its conclusions, noted that the lack of survivors and witnesses, and the incomplete information on all that the Edmund Fitzgerald was facing on Lake Superior that day and evening, meant "the proximate cause of the loss of the SS Edmund Fitzgerald cannot be determined."
But the board goes on to list a suspected cause: flooding through the ship's topside hatches.
The report states that the Edmund Fitzgerald's flooding began early on Nov. 10 and worsened throughout the day and evening as the violent storm on Lake Superior gained strength. The taking on of water reduced the ship's freeboard, making it ride lower and lower in the raging water. The Coast Guard report notes that Edmund Fitzgerald Capt. Ernest McSorley reported being in some of the worst seas he had ever seen.
"It is probable that, at the time he reported this, Fitzgerald had lost so much freeboard from the flooding of the cargo hold that the effect of the sea was much greater than he would have ordinarily experienced," the report states.
The Coast Guard report noted that the sinking of the Edmund Fitzgerald happened so quickly, no deployment of lifeboats occurred, nor a mayday distress call sent over the ship's radio — despite the ship's crew having been on the radio with the nearby freighter Arthur M. Anderson just minutes before on the evening of Nov. 10.The report further noted that the Fitzgerald's positioning on the Lake Superior bottom — its front section upright and looking as if it collided with the muddy bottom at speed; the middle section of the ship disintegrated and the rear section capsized and nearly perpendicular but less than 200 feet from the front section on the lake bottom — tend to indicate the ship didn't suffer a structural breaking apart on the lake surface, as the ship halves would have likely remained buoyant for at least a brief time and the raging, 50-knot winds would have taken the two ship halves farther from one another.
The marine board walked through how a loss of buoyancy due to severe topside flooding through the ship's faulty or failing hatches potentially unfolded on the fateful night of Nov. 10, 1975.
"Finally, as the storm reached its peak intensity, so much freeboard was lost that the bow pitched down and dove into a wall of water, and the vessel was unable to recover," the report states. "Within a matter of seconds, the cargo (26,000 tons of iron ore taconite pellets) rushed forward, the bow plowed into the bottom of the lake, and the midships structure disintegrated, allowing the submerged stern section, now emptied of cargo, to roll over and override the other structure, finally coming to rest upside-down atop the disintegrated middle portion of the ship."
The NTSB final report from its investigation reached a similar conclusion.
"(T)he probable cause of this accident was the sudden massive flooding of the cargo hold due to the collapse of one or more hatch covers," its report stated.
George "Red" Burgner was a Great Lakes mariner for decades and served as a steward or cook on the Edmund Fitzgerald for 10 years. Burgner left the Fitzgerald earlier in 1975 to have surgery on chronic bone spurs in his feet — and turned down a company invite to return to the ship just days before its fateful voyage.In a January 1978 deposition, Burgner stated that the Fitzgerald frequently left port without yet fully securing the approximately 68 clamps that went around the ship's hatch covers. It has contributed to some speculating that the ship's hatches may not have been perfectly secured when the fierce storm hammered the boat.
Could the Fitzgerald have bottomed out on a shoal?
The captain of a Great Lakes freighter that also endured the storm of Nov. 10, 1975, on Lake Superior, and was the nearest ship to the Edmund Fitzgerald at the time it sank, speculated that the Fitz may have sunk from damage to its hull from bottoming out on a shoal, a shallower area in the lake due to rocks and sandbars.
"(T)he Fitz was to the west of our course line. Maybe too close to Caribou Island," said Capt. Jesse "Bernie" Cooper of the bulk carrier Arthur M. Anderson, in a handwritten recounting of the Fitzgerald's sinking about 10 years after the event.
"(The time was) 15:20 — 3:20 p.m. The Fitzgerald called with the information that she had a fence rail down, two vents damaged, plus a starboard list. He (Fitzgerald Captain McSorley) also had his pumps going, so that means that the Fitz had to have water in one or two of her side tanks. Probably a stress fracture of the hull.
"At this time the Fitz was mortally wounded. How bad we wouldn't know until later. My own opinion is that she bottomed out on a shoal. This area had not been surveyed since the 1915 era."
Robert Thibaudeau spent 45 years as a mariner on the Great Lakes, the last 18 years as a captain of freighters. His last ship was the MV Paul R. Tregurtha, the longest bulk carrier freighter on the Great Lakes at more than 1,013 feet. He retired as a captain in 2021.
He, too, speculates that the Fitz grounded on a shoal, and suspects it's one known as Six Fathom Shoal, on the north end of Caribou Island in northeastern Lake Superior. Bedrock ridges there take lake levels to 36 feet or even shallower in places, a potential problem for a deep-drafting vessel like a Great Lakes bulk carrier. In the aftermath of the Fitzgerald sinking, the Canadian government in 1976 updated its bathymetric maps near Caribou Island from those created in the early 1900s, and mapped the shoal about a mile farther east from the island than had been previously mapped.
"If you look at where they went, the track line, there is a 36-foot (deep) shoal area they potentially could have got close to just off Caribou in that area," Thibaudeau said. "I believe they could have gotten close to that 36-foot (shoal) spot."
The captain added that even if the ship was in navigable water near the shoal, the heavy seas from the storm could have thrusted the ship's bottom into the bedrock.
Officials with the Lake Carriers Association, a Westlake, Ohio-based trade organization representing the Great Lakes freighter shipping industry, also concluded that the Edmund Fitzgerald bottomed out on a shoal in the immediate years after the sinking.
But some dispute the possibility.
Sean Kery, a senior principal engineer and naval architect for CACI, a Virginia-based government contractor that works with the U.S. Navy and other clients; and Ben Fisher, with Bremerton, Washington-based SAFE Boats International, a company that designs boats for military, law enforcement and first responders, in a 2012 presentation of a forensic examination of the Edmund Fitzgerald's sinking, rejected the shoal damage theory.
"There is no sign of grounding damage to the exposed stern section, which would be the deepest in the water under normal conditions," Kerry and Fisher's research paper stated.
Ric Mixter agrees. The Wixom resident is a diver, documentary filmmaker, Great Lakes shipwreck historian and author of the 2022 book "Tattletale Sounds: The Edmund Fitzgerald investigations." He is among the few who have dived the Edmund Fitzgerald shipwreck, in a submersible in 1994.
"I've totally ruled out running aground," he said. "I've got lots of people who tell me that Six Fathom Shoal doesn't exist."
In addition to McSorley, three other crew members on the Fitzgerald that fateful night — First Mate John H. McCarthy, Second Mate James A. Pratt, and Third Mate Michael E. Armagost — had attained the designation of Master from the U.S. Coast Guard, meaning they had passed through a rigorous licensing and endorsement process showing their experience and proficiency to safely and efficiently operate a ship such as a Great Lakes bulk carrier.
"They had made that turn (by Michipicoten and Caribou islands) more than a hundred times," said Mixter. "John Simmons, the wheelsman, had been on the Fitzgerald since 1959. He was the longest-serving employee on board that ship.
"To insult those guys to say ... they cut that corner and ran aground, it's absolutely silly."
A faulty 'backbone' and rogue waves could have doomed the Fitz
In addition to serving as a cook on the Edmund Fitzgerald for a decade, Red Burgner was also the ship's winter "keeper" for seven years, an employee who stays on the ship at dock or drydock overwinter, helping coordinate maintenance and keeping the ship operational, and serving as a point of contact with contractors coming to the ship.
In his January 1978 deposition, Burgner stated that the Edmund Fitzgerald had recurring problems with a loose keel, the steel backbone of the ship along its bottom, from which the hull is constructed. Burgner said he observed the loose keel, with sections receiving only spots of "tack welds" instead of solid welds along the length of the keel to reattach it to the ship, as recently as overwinter 1973-74.
Burgner also testified that the ship would move and heave with large waves in a way that he didn't experience on other boats, and take longer to straighten out after such waves. The Fitzgerald also made "groaning" noises that Burgner said he'd never heard on any other boat he'd served on.
Burgner stated he was present for a conversation where maintenance men working on the lower decks of the boat told McSorley the problem had arisen again earlier in 1975, as the Edmund Fitzgerald was being prepared for the upcoming shipping season.
"They came in the mess room door, had coffee, sat down and started talking," Burgner stated. "And they said, 'Captain, the keel's loose on this son of a bitch again.' "Burgner said McSorley replied, "'I don't give a (expletive). All this son of a bitch has got to do is stay together one more year. After that, I don't give a shit what happens to it.'"
Burgner's account of keel problems on the Edmund Fitzgerald is corroborated by marine engineer and naval architect Joseph E. Fischer, then president of Bay Engineering Inc., who, in a recollection years after the Fitzgerald sank, recalled that a company he was with in 1969, R.A. Steam in Sturgeon Bay, Wisconsin, "was asked to investigate the continuing failure of the longitudinal keelsons attachment to the bottom shell plate" of the Edmund Fitzgerald.
"Each year, a survey would show cracks in the weld of the center vertical keel to the bottom shell," Fischer said. "These cracks would be gouged out and rewelded only to show the same cracks in the following years."
Mixter thinks it's a key to the Fitzgerald's demise. With Burgner's testimony, "there is a clear indication (McSorley) knew there was an issue, but he still pushed through five gale-force winds in that season, one on Lake Huron and the rest on Superior," Mixter said. "So each time that keel was getting loose."
Cooper, the captain aboard the Anderson on the same Nov. 10, only miles away from the Fitzgerald, recalled seas of "25 to 35 feet" that evening on eastern Lake Superior.
"Sometime before 7 p.m. we took two of the largest seas of the trip," Cooper recounted in his handwritten retelling of that night. "The first one flooded our boat deck. It had enough force to come down on the starboard lifeboat, pushing it into the saddles with a force strong enough to damage the bottom of the lifeboat ... the second large sea put green water on our bridge deck! This is about 35 feet above the waterline!
"Did these two large seas reach the Fitzgerald at 7:10 p.m.?"
The Fitzgerald had already reported a fence rail down, vents damaged and a starboard list, with two pumps activated — signs the ship was already taking on water. The ship was riding lower above the waterline. The large waves might have meant its death knell.
"It collapsed Hatches 1 and 5, and the ship couldn't recover," Mixter speculated. "It broke its back on the surface. It dove underneath the water, and the stern section ripped off and flipped upside-down."
That more or less coincides with the conclusions of the 2012 analysis by Kery and Fisher: a cascading disaster of two smashed vents, flooding ballast tanks, the Fitzgerald's forward house flooding, the forward two hatch covers blown in, allowing yet more water to rush in and weigh down the ship, and a hull girder failure.
Mixter believes what exactly caused the Edmund Fitzgerald to sink on the night of Nov. 10, 1975, leaving its crew of 29 dead, is possible to know. But it would take more dives and further research on the ship's remains on the Lake Superior bottom to understand. It's time to overcome reservations about it, he said.
"There are so many questions that could be solved with a quick sonar scan with the newest technology we have," Mixter said. "Many of the voices that were so vocally opposed to us (shipwreck divers) have faded since they have passed away.
The sinking of the Edmund Fitzgerald, 50 years later |
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